Chapter 3

Approaching women through myth: Vital tool or self-delusion?

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Women in Greek mythology are of interest both to those studying the place of women, and to those studying the nature of mythology. In this paper I ask whether Greek mythology gives the former category good value: how much may we learn about Greek women on the basis of the mythological evidence? What follows is divided into three parts: in the first part I ask on what suppositions Greek mythology might be thought to tell us about women; in the second part I look at the instances of Helen and Clytaemnestra; and in the third I try to set in context the apparently more concrete data that can be assembled from mythology related to female initiation rites.

USING GREEK MYTH

Myth as useful tool?

Myth is not a medium of historical record for times beyond our grasp. Indeed, it is to mistake the language of myth to suppose that it directly reveals historical data, let alone events. Though it is a tradition, it is predominantly fictional and ideological, not documentary. For instance, actual matriarchies are not necessitated by mythological narrations about Amazons. Their topsy-turvy society where women are warriors, situated ‘outside the range of normal human experience’ (Walcot 1984: 42), so far from evidencing the arbitrariRess of male domination of society, expresses that domination kat' enantion, by opposites – like the myths of battles against Giants or Centaurs. Greek society is not the only one where the myth of matriarchy belongs to ‘a prior and chaotic era before the present social order was established’. Nor should conclusions be drawn about ‘Daily Life in the Bronze Age’ from Homer’s telling of the mythology (cf. Pomeroy 1975: ch. 2).

There is a special danger for the interpreter when myth presents an extreme, unthinkable in ‘normal’ Greek life (e.g. Amazons). This danger may even vitiate Vernant’s discernment of a specific exogamous system in those myths where sets of sons are to marry sets of daughters, for instance in the case of the Danaids (and similarly other myths that seem to indicate an endogamous system).

If myth is so unhelpful for history, one may understand the depressive view of myth altogether in Cameron and Kuhrt (1993: x): ‘Greek historians are forced to work extensively with material drawn from literature and myth’ (my italics). This makes it look as though myth (and literature, which, as we shall see, is sometimes nearly the same thing) is a second-rate tool used when historical information runs short. But are there other uses which make myth more than a source of last resort? Perhaps it can in some way be more useful than the documentary evidence that we don’t have, if: ‘Myths illustrate common attitudes more clearly and simply than history’ (Lefkowitz 1993: 49; my italics). Why should this be so? History is unavoidably processed and ideologised – otherwise why recount it – but history is also constrained by fact and truth, where myth may tell what it wishes without such inhibitions, provided a narrative results.

Yet, however useful myth may ‘illustrate common attitudes’, allegiance to it for this purpose is far from steadfast. In the new edition of their fine sourcebook, Mary Lefkowitz and Maureen Fant continue deliberately to exclude mythology (1992: xxxiv). Why, if myth is so useful an illustrative tool? One problem is that myths cannot be assigned to ‘specific historical contexts’ (ibid.). Though myth should be useful, it is difficult to determine or exhibit its significance immediately and transparently. In any case, whose version of a myth would one set down – and would each version bear a different significance?

Nonetheless, the perception of a revelatory quality in myth can be deepened by a theoretical framework accommodating psychology and culture, as exemplified by Froma Zeitlin (1986: 124): ‘Myths . . . often address those problematic areas of human experience that resist rational explanation, and they explore and express the complexity of cultural norms, values and preoccupations.’ This type of statement, even if, un petit peu, an article of Parisian faith, does have a remarkable power to command assent. Yet there still remains a considerable difficulty. Is it possible for myths to deliver statements about women
Variables and constants, texts and intertext

Another difficulty which emerges is that of indiscriminacy. Whose attitudes are myths held to reveal? It is surely not possible in a critical age to speak of anything so gross as ‘The Role of Women in Greek Society’. Yet if Greek societies can be viewed as relatively constant and unchanging, there may even be some justification for collecting all material regardless of historical circumstances, like Lévi-Strauss, thereby composing a single portrait of the Greek mind and its ideologies. By this path, an indiscriminate collection of Greek myth would deliver an indiscriminate portrait of Greek society.

Greek myth tempts us to this view. Any material which looks so non-historical misleads us into thinking that it is somehow unaffected by exact historical circumstance, that it is supra-historical. And, true, its messages (as one might expect from a product of Greek antiquity) do consistently differ from those broadcast by our own cultures. Greek culture, despite its local variations, was perhaps more stable and homogeneous than modern North American and European society. It did after all subscribe to the epic, dramatic and artistic corpus of fictions less ambivalently than, say, Europe subscribes to American screen fiction or the values of Eurodisney. It is therefore possible to see in Greek mythology certain recurrent and characteristic social views. For instance, the categories of women visible in myth undergo a certain ideological distortion: females may be parthenoi (maiden) or gymaiakes (matrons), but not unmarried women. Widows, too, barely register, except maybe for the Graiai who confront Perseus – marginal, disabled, disgusting. So, elementary social data of broad application, the constants of Greek society, are embedded in myth – even if a study of the orators might deliver this information more reliably.

Yet Greek society changes over the centuries, and substantially enough to cause us hesitation. The world of New Comedy and of the unhappy loves of the Hellenistic poets (themselves intensive users of mythology) is not the world of Athenian tragedy. The women’s world of classical Athens was restricted to an unusual extent. And ‘democratic’ Athens altogether is a different world from that of the symposia of the Archaic poets – which itself may have had a different cultural ambience from however we imagine the reception of the Epic. Such variation might lead us ultimately to the secure, if slightly Pyrrhonic, position of Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood (1991: 17), that myths must first and foremost be studied through their individual realisations, through what I now describe as ‘texts’ whether literary or artistic:

we must read each individual articulation of the myth as it stands;
we must not import narrative elements and meanings from one mythological articulation to another, and assume that one part of a myth in a text necessarily evoked for the ancient reader . . . all the other variants.

On this view, Greek society, on a first pass, is only safely viewed as a set of variables – and clearly cases can be shown where constants fail (e.g. the anomalous Aphrodite of Locri). Myth-criticism thus becomes text-criticism and finds a corollary in the method of Mary Lefkowitz (1986: 13): ‘I am not going to try to interpret myths that only survive in summary or quotation, where we cannot know or recover the emphasis in the original.’ Where literary criticism is not possible, neither is myth interpretation.

Between constants and variables lies the view that Greek mythology is an intertext – an accumulated and accumulating system of narratives and perceptions which determine the interpretation of any individual text within, or added to, the collection (Dowden 1992: 7–9). This intertext and its implicit ideologies continually evolve, and every text will introduce, however minutely, a new perspective. New tellings may largely reinforce an existing ideology, but they may also contribute, like change in language, to a gradual shift in the system. This is a flexible model, even if it does contain insoluble difficulties – how to determine the rate of change, or how to know the extent to which other elements in the intertext were present for authentic ancient interpreters (= ideal readers). Sourvinou-Inwood may consider the latter difficulty too great to allow scientific treatment of myth, but she also envisages a final restoration of the concept of myth by assembling and comparing individual articulations, whose common features will then illuminate the society encompassing the variants.7

Without this intertextual view, a book on Amazons or on Centaurs and Amazons (as such) is not possible. For instance, although Page duBois refers to individual texts involving Centaurs, she nevertheless envisages a body of material: ‘In many of the episodes in the Centaur myth, the horse/men sustained Ixion’s hostility to legal marriage and
to the forms of exchange typical to Greek civilization (1982: 28; my italics). Is this indiscriminate writing, or is this making fair use of an intertext, a constant in Greek civilisation?

This, then, is the danger of indiscriminacy: can we depart from interpretation of a particular text, with the idiosyncrasies of its time, locale and author, to something of broader and more systematic interpretation of a particular text, with the idiosyncrasies of its time, history, sociology. But there is a price of shallowness and amateurism to be paid. How are we to look into 'The Greek Mind', about Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus? About 'the Amazon myth', or only about the figure of Penthesilea in Arktinos? Or not even that, as the text of Arktinos is lost?

**Psychoanalysis - or what?**

One constant that might attract our attention is that monsters are often, even usually, female (e.g. Skylla, Medusa, Echidna). We may speculate that in the construction of the fantastic, the mind reveals something of how it really works. It is one of the joys of Classics, and especially of myth, that one can range freely between disciplines: literature, history, sociology. But there is a price of shallowness and amateurism to be paid. How are we to look into 'The Greek Mind', if we do not understand as experts how to look into the modern, or any, mind? It is very easy to write about the sexual symbolism of Medusa's snaky hair and to declare that the power of turning to stone is a metaphor for the perceived power to cause impotence, but we should have more exact motives for subscribing to such ideas than that they are interesting, modern and sexual.

If we turn to psychoanalysis for our answers, we may be thinking along these lines:

1. myth gives us an insight into 'The Greek Mind';
2. psychoanalysis is the expertise, the τέχνη, of the mind;
3. Freud devised a reliable and objective science of psychoanalysis.

DuBois has questioned this way of thinking, observing that 'Freud seems to believe that antiquity recorded, undisguised, the simple unpressed desires of mankind' (1988: 22). More precisely, Freud believed that myths, like dreams, allowed the realities of the subconscious to emerge more clearly than is possible in real life. In addition, in common with the prevailing culture of his times, he ascribed undue authority to classical material, over-privileging Greek myth in the process. Moreover, Freud's myth, as duBois (1988: chs 1–2) has rightly underlined, delivers an unchanging, absolute map of the human psyche, not Greek but universal. Simultaneously, this absolute map is constructed on the basis of the hierarchies (notably male) and complexes of 'Victorian' Vienna, superimposing an ideology above Greek myth rather than unloaking the ideology below. The real problem with Freudian psychoanalysis is to explain why it has appeared to work clinically. As with the success of ancient oracles, one should perhaps speak of unsatisfied needs, visible authority and a product that meshed fruitfully with the fictions, ideologies and (in the broadest sense) the myths by which people live.

But if we abandon a Freudian solution, what verifiable basis do we have for the analysis of the psychological presuppositions of myth? Or shall we adopt a sort of post-structuralist literary criticism of myth in which the critic perceives and the reader, if so disposed, nods in approbation? Unless there is a describable science of exposing the relationship between Greek myth (particular texts, or intertext) and local or general Greek ideologies, it is hard to know how social attitudes may be deduced from myth without circularity. It may even be that myth can never be the starting-point, as implied by Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood (1991: 16): 'in order to make sense of Greek myths, it is necessary to investigate a variety of questions pertaining to all aspects of the Greek world, through a variety of methodological tools and approaches'. The converse, to use myth as a tool to make sense of the Greek world, looks increasingly difficult.

Thus we reach the dilemma. Myth is a vital tool if it bears on social values more directly or more profoundly than history does; but the science of interpretation is unclear and there are serious methodological pitfalls, notably self-delusion – just getting back what you put in.

**HELEN AND CLYTAEMNESTRA**

As a sample of these problems, I turn to the deductions we might make about Greek society from the figures of Helen and Clytaemnestra in Greek myth. So far as possible I consider them in their intertextual form as opposed to the individual realisations by individual authors.

**The oikos and the Trojan War**

I start from the aïkos, something central to Greek society, a constant. Paris removes Helen to Troy and is therefore an extreme case of an
adulterer. Extreme cases are characteristic of myth. The abduction of Helen functions as the cause of the Trojan War, which is therefore in some measure about the destruction that results from the undoing of the oikos. Destroy the oikos, destroy the city? The intertext of archaic and classical Greek myth also mirrors, or recapitulates, this theme at the end of the story: Agamemnon returns home to find his oikos too disrupted by adultery. This adultery destroys the krios, Agamemnon. The adulteress is Helen's sister, Clytaemnestra, and their sisterhood seems innately meaningful, as in Aeschylus' Agamemnon.10

So far, a message about the destruction of the oikos. Yet how shall this message be phrased? Perhaps: the Greek fear (shall it be an 'obsessive' fear?) of the destruction of the oikos, that fundamental building-block of their society, finds expression in myths of the Trojan War and Agamemnon's nosis, myths which entail awful suffering, destruction of man and of city. Or is this to drive the myth too hard, to look for trouble in the Greek psyche? Perhaps in the maggiore the Greek positive evaluation of their fundamental building-block, the oikos, is asserted by their fictions of what happens when it is destroyed.

Clytaemnestra

What of the women in these myths? Clytaemnestra is consistently treated as faithless and fauluted for embracing adultery, calling into question the view that women were viewed as passive victims of adultery.11 This is a model of a woman who fails the requirement to support the oikos, as indeed some women will.

But this tells us little until we see a fuller portrait in an individual text. Perhaps we will turn to Homer's Agamemnom, who considers that there is nothing worse than a woman and that Clytaemnestra has brought disrepute upon future women, even good ones (Odyssey 11.427-34). Yet that is said from Agamemnon's point of view, obviously partial, even he will admit that there are good women and that Penelope is an instance of one (Odyssey 11.444-6). And the interest of the Odyssey as a whole is to talk about the oikos and the forces that hold society together (like xenia). Within the context of the Odyssey one of the social foundations we learn about is the value of a good woman - part of which is negative reminiscence of Clytaemnestra.

It is not an uncommon characteristic of tellings of Greek myths to highlight the distinct, plainly that made by Greek men, between good and bad women. However much the Odyssean Agamemnon might think so, the purpose of these myths is not to give the impression that women as a whole are unreliable - that is simply to repeat Aristophanes' joke in Thesmophoriazusai where women have it in for Euripides because of his depictions of them. Yet it is clear that this compartmentalisation of women into good and bad reflects a very limited, and to our eyes distinctive, view of their place. They are there to make an oikos work and the failure to do so may even be, as Aeschylus depicts it in the Agamemnon, to lose the claim to womanhood, to live in some sort of androgynous no-woman's land. Included among their duties is to look after the children, but there may be something derogatory about Aeschylus resting Clytaemnestra's defence on Agamemnon's slaughter of Iphigeneia: this is the instinctive bonding of the mother to the child (like a bitch with her pups), and to the female child at that – without credit, because killing Iphigeneia, though a foul act, did not in itself (unlike the murder of Agamemnon) destroy the oikos. This is a revealing emphasis, but it is the emphasis of a text, not of the intertext, of the myth however told.

Hesiod too had distinguished between the good wife and the bad wife, dwelling rather more on the latter (Works and Days 702-6). But this text, like other Greek misogynistic writing, should be handled with care. Indeed it reinforces the social values of an archaic Greek male. But the work, or rather the narrator's persona, does have its own particular character which is a large part of what makes it distinctive and interesting as a literary product. The narrator is ferociously miserable, pessimistic, conservative, old-fashioned and over the top.12 There is surely, even for archaic Greek culture, something splendidly 'blunt' about 'First of all get yourself a house, a woman, and a plough-ox' (Works and Days 405).

Helen

The intertext lays more stress on Helen's beauty than her guilt - a contrast with Clytaemnestra. But beauty was then, as now ('Samantha Fox stole my husband', an interesting comparand), a double-edged asset. Hesiod warns against the woman who talks smoothly, shows off her derriere, but is after your granary (Works and Days 373-4). Pandora too, in specially ruinous intertextuality with Helen, overflows with beauty given by Aphrodite.13 What then are we to deduce? Greek men recognised that their judgement could be distorted by sexual attraction? But is there more? There seems to be force in the
accumulating picture of Woman in Greek Myth. There are good women and bad women: good women maintain the oikos; attractive women are a danger (their fault as much as the man's). Add to this the known exclusion of women from discussion and planning, that they were often fifteen years younger than their husbands, and then the mythology can be seen to relegate women in a way consistent with our knowledge of society.

Though this may be the drift of treatments of Helen, in the hands of a great artist such as Homer the picture can be modified in unexpected ways. Emerging at the wall of Troy to view the duel between Menelaos and Paris, she is, as Kakridis (1971: 34) recognised, like the bride at the contest for her hand. Yet for all her beauty — recognised by the Trojan elders (Iliad 3.158) — she is now regretful and responsible, even integrated into the new oikos, though admittedly the balance of the relationship between Paris and her is incorrect in comparison with that between Hektor and Andromache. She is no longer the pitiable passive creature, but the still beautiful yet now invisible woman, torn by remorse, and aware of her responsibility' (Kakridis 1971: 36). In the Odyssey too, she is — perhaps a little too much, perhaps over-compensating — a repository of social correctness.16

But in other authors of the archaic period matters are simpler: the daughters of Tyndareus exist to be bad examples. This can be seen from passages of Stesichoros and of the Pseudo—Hesiodic Catalogue of Women (both preserved in a scholion on Euripides, Orestes 249):

Because Tyndareus once, when sacrificing to the gods, forgot Kypris (Aphrodite) of the gentle gifts, she was angry and made his daughters two-marriaged, three-marriaged and men-leavers.

(Stesichoros, fr. 223 Page)

... At them laughter-loving Aphrodite felt envy as she looked, and she inflicted evil reputation upon them.

Timandre then had abandoned Echemos and gone, and came to Phyleus,17 him loved by the immortal gods; and, just so, Clytaemnestra, abandoning divine Agamemnon, lay beside Aigisthos and took a worse spouse; and, just so, Helen shamed the bed of blind Menelaos.

(Hesiod, fr. 176 Merkelbach-West)

Whether it is the envy of Aphrodite, or Tyndareus' forgetfulness leading to her revenge, it is the power of sex that makes his daughters disruptive and destructive. Thus Helen is most naturally characterised without redeeming features: she is a power for destruction in Aeschylus' Agamemnon (a Trojan Horse all on her own) and in Euripides' Troades an inexusable, unduly attractive, criminal. This aspect is what makes it misleading of Brelich to have presented her as perfection, marriage to whom would be the ultimate fulfilment for the hero.18 She is not. She is an excess. If she was mere perfection, she would have a greater husband than (Homer's or tragedy's) Menelaos. The accumulated sense of the intertext is based upon, and illustrates, the views of a male society concerned at the difficulties in controlling female sexuality, in keeping it within the bounds that a Helen would defeat, in preserving the oikos against this danger to male hegemony. Even so, the mythology only stresses the tensions we already perceived in Greek society (just read Lysias on the dangers of allowing your wife to attend a funeral). This is of course why Walcot's 1984 article first states the prevailing social conditions and then finds them in myth — less a case of 'mythological evidence' than mythological exemplification. The greater interest seems to lie in the stance taken up relative to the mythic intertext by great artists and in the ways in which they reformulate that intertext.

Mythic women: conclusions

So myth provides illustrations of what we already know, but does not particularly add to our knowledge. This is shown by myths of girls going mad and hanging themselves, connected by Helen King with statements in Hippokrates.19 That mythology is locked, indecipherable, until we have the Hippocratic material (though of course there is the interesting counter-conclusion that Hippokrates is to some extent mythologising life).

More fundamentally, it is the individual texts which present more complex and more interesting views. This must be a concern to the mythologist, because to interpret an individual text is not to interpret mythology, only to state how that myth is 'interpreted' in the context of this author's value system. This is what I, for one, understand as literary criticism — the explanation of the value-coding, conscious and unconscious, of the texts of authors. If this is what the interpretation of myth consists of, there is no separate science of myth-interpretation, unless it be a particular form of literary criticism encompassing the intertextuality implicit in the reuse of myths.
Because, without reuse, there are no myths, only one-off fictions. The myth must have an existence over and above the individual telling. So, for instance, if we discuss Pandora, fruitful though that may be, we are not discussing mythology, we are discussing Hesiod.20

In the case of Helen and Clytaemnestra, I may have chosen figures who are not specially revealing, though they seem remarkable enough to me. Would Perseus, Medusa and Andromeda have proved more capable of delivering deductions about society that we had not already planted there? Would the figure of Medea have delivered results independent of the particular realisations of Euripides and Apollonius? I think she might pose questions, but the answers would have to come from elsewhere: perhaps a Detienne-ish study of family, butchery, cooking and herbs?

**HYPOTHESISING PASSAGE RITES**

So far I have denied that social data and views over and above what we already know can be extracted from myth. This is not inconsistent with the attempt to reconstruct maidens' passage rites from mythology (cf. my *Death and the Maiden*, 1989), because myths can help us posit rituals of a certain, already broadly understood, specification, even if they do not help reconstruct otherwise unevincing ideologies.

Mythology can be validly approached in different ways. One is to examine it synchronically, for instance in the context of Athenian society, e.g. by privileging the evidence of tragedy. Diachronically, however, individual myths have a history and I have argued (the method goes back to K.O. Müller) that myths come from somewhere and the somewhere is often stated internally in the myth by its localisation.21 If accepted, this approach then delivers a historical context for the myth, though at an early ('original') and uncertain date, before it becomes part of any inter-state repertoire. The second step in this argument is to relate some of these myths (I do not know what proportion of Greek Mythology as a whole) to local ritual. In some few cases we will know of the ritual, notably the Arkteia at Brauron associated with the passage from childhood to adulthood. In other cases the Brauronian example is used as a model and a ritual hypothesised at some other place in the light of the motifs present in a myth located there (e.g. girl at puberty, animal metamorphosis, exclusion from the community). This is a historical hypothesis claiming that a locally sited ritual would have some explanatory force for a myth of a certain type.

What, then, has one discovered by these means about women in Greek society? Perhaps that the step taken by maidens into adulthood had been sufficiently prominent and interesting to society at large for it to generate a substantial and colourful mythology; perhaps too that such rituals had been a regular feature of Greek societies before the historic age. Such rituals, what rituals? The word that comes to the lips is 'passage rites', carrying with it its own ethnological baggage. Yet there is a danger of assimilating Greek conditions unduly to prevalent ethnological images. Unlike initiations in most societies, Greek rites are typically selective: singular adolescent priestess, mythical trios of daughters, seven girls and seven boys at Corinth, select maidens as Bears at Brauron, or combined with select boys at Patrai, at most a 50-strong dance group mirrored in the Danaids.22 It is difficult to capture the social dynamics here, except by appeal to what we know in the supposedly faded condition of these rites in classical times: the pride, for instance, of an Aristophanic Lysiistrata. The mythology at most reinforces—and deepens the antiquity of—this selective world.

On the other hand, the mythology does suggest a social fact very sparsely attested in real life: no gap between marriageability and marriage. Unless this is the convenience and economy of myth, when translated into reality it suggests group marriage at the end of initiation—whether only of the selective participants, or of the whole age-group of which they are members. And at the same time, the mythology does allow us some limited access to a world-view where girls' transitions are felt, and felt important. The drastic mythic mutations (death, metamorphosis and madness) of girls at this moment, confronted by an angry goddess, reflect both the definitive break from maidenhood that Greek societies required and the need to place such a critical moment under the protection of a goddess. These Greek societies view themselves as consisting of strongly marked categories of membership—something reflected for gender in mythology of Amazons, and for life-stages in this mythology of passage-rites.

However, it is not clear that a specific ideology of maidenhood can be constructed from the myths, other than in the most obvious outlines (girls are there to become child-bearing women, not warriors, and at an early age compared to girls in our society). In particular, the different animals employed in different myths of metamorphosis (deer, bear, cow) neither deliver a uniform imagery nor appear intended to contrast with each other; they belong to local systems and are not, so far as we can discern, constructed systematically in
relation to each other. Thus whatever one may imagine the place of ‘bear’ to be in Greek imagery or psychology, it delivers only a local conclusion (Brauron, or Kallisto’s southern Arcadia).

Some of the puzzlement of mythology may be resolved by this approach, because the supposition of a link with rites which satisfy certain conditions explains the shape and existence of myths such as those of Iphigeneia or the Proitids. But I am less sure that the conditions requisite for such rites are sufficient to advance greatly our understanding of Greek society; and anyone who looks for this sort of illumination in work of this type is, I fear, likely to be disappointed.

CONCLUSIONS

So, from the perspective of the historical age, mythic material may enhance our picture of Greek ideas about society in general and women in particular. It may also provide a congenial space within which the artist can construct a dialogue of ideas and values. Myth shows the power of particular attitudes if they can achieve the prominence of being incorporated into common societal fiction, though it offers no completely new evidence. Similarly, from the perspective of bygone ages of Greek society, whose social remnants can be perceived through Greek mythology, there is little to surprise and the picture is more derived from the historical conditions of Greek societies than one might think: one is not uncooking a wholly new society, with different structures and values. I doubt if one could do that on the basis of the mythology of any nation.

In reverse, however, it must be said that our knowledge of Greek, and Athenian, society has much to tell us about the shaping and concerns of Greek Mythology. I thus conclude that the subject of women in mythology offers better value to the student of mythology than to the student of women. Is this why there are no myths in Lefkowitz and Fant (1992)?

NOTES

1 Dowden 1992: e.g. 60–73.